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 When a good science base is not enough to create competitive industries: 
Lock-in and inertia in Russian systems of innovation 
 
Rajneesh Narula* and Irina Jormanainen**  
 
Abstract 
Despite a well-developed science and technology base and considerable industrial capacity 
during the soviet era, Russia has largely failed to create a competitive industrial sector 
despite two decades of transition. This paper seeks to understand why Russia has not 
succeeded despite having relatively favourable initial conditions. We develop an 
understanding of its innovation system and the interplay between the firm and the non-firm 
sector. We argue that – in any economy - when political and economic regimes were rapidly 
reformed, there is considerable structural inertia associated with complex interdependencies 
between the state, domestic firms and the formal and informal institutions that bind them 
together. In the case of Russia, this inertia has resulted in a system-wide lock-in, and 
industrial enterprises continued to engage in routines that generated a sub-optimal outcome. 
Market forces did not result in the western-style innovation system, but a hybrid one, with 
numerous features of the soviet system. A significant segment of industry maintains a 
Soviet-style dependence on ‘top-down’ supply-driven allocation of resources and a reliance 
on external (but domestic) network of sources for innovation and capital. At the same time, 
‘new’ firms and industries have also evolved which undertake their own R&D, and utilise 
foreign sources of capital and technology, and at least partly determine their production and 
innovative activities on the basis on market forces. 
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When a good science base is not enough to create competitive industries: Lock-in and 
inertia in Russian systems of innovation 
 
Rajneesh Narula and Irina Jormanainen 
 
 
1. Introduction 
It has been widely recognized that local firms’ growth depends on their ability to build 
technological competences by acquiring knowledge from both domestic and non-domestic 
sources (Bell and Pavitt, 1993; Kim, 1997; Figuereido, 2002). The last two decades have 
seen a greater emphasis on the role of MNEs as an especially vital source of advanced 
technological knowledge. Indeed, neoclassical economists, governments and supranational 
institutions now consider FDI as an indispensable aspect of promoting economic growth in 
lagging economies. The belief is that in the medium- to long-term, domestic firms in the 
host country will benefit from MNE spillovers and linkages, as well as through indirect 
mechanisms such as the competition effect. 
However, empirical studies to date on the extent of the benefits of MNEs knowledge 
for local firms’ growth have provided mixed evidence, with increasing emphasis on the 
simultaneous need for countries to possess a certain threshold level of absorptive capacity 
and technological infrastructure to benefit from FDI if they are to create linkages and 
internalise spillovers with MNEs1. Indeed the role of the MNE may well be exaggerated – 
countries such as Korea and Japan have been able to build up domestic capacity without 
recourse to substantial FDI flows, and there are other means and sources for knowledge 
acquisition and creation complementary to those from MNEs (Radosevic 2006). But all are 
in agreement that a certain domestic economic milieu needs to exist to promote the growth 
of domestic firms through innovation and learning. 
However, the need for domestic conditions to be ‘right’ have not been examined in 
enough detail, and thus far and the literature does not offer a comprehensive explanation 
why domestic firms in countries with less favourable initial conditions in terms of the 
domestic knowledge base (e.g. China) have demonstrated a faster growth than firms in 
countries with more attractive initial conditions (e.g. Russia). Despite having a formidable 
                                               
1
 The literature on the effects of MNE activity on local firms is quite large and diverse. Some recent highlights 
include Haddad and Harrison (1993), Aitken and Harrison (1999), Djankov and Hoekman (2000), Konings 
(2001), Buckley, et.al. (2002), Damijan, et. al. (2003), Bell and Marin, (2004), Aseidu (2006), Smarzynska 
(2004), Marin and Bell (2006), Meyer and Sinani (2008). 
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position in terms of domestic R&D activity and a well-developed science and technology 
infrastructure prior to transition, Russia has been outpaced by other laggard countries 
including India, China, the Czech Republic, to name but a few.  
This study attempts to provide an understanding of some of the factors which 
influence the ability of domestic industrial enterprises to grow and enhance their 
competitiveness, focusing in particular on how the relationships with other players in the 
non-firm sector affect this process. We seek to answer the following question: Why have 
local firms in some countries -such as Russia- not demonstrated rapid growth, despite 
having a high science and technology infrastructure standard, a large supply of well-trained 
scientists and engineers, and where domestic industry was previously capable of producing 
advanced technologies and products, and for which an economically viable domestic market 
size existed? 
It is, of course, also well-known that there is a high degree of endogenity and 
interaction amongst and between institutions, science and technology infrastructure, the 
competitiveness of industrial enterprises and the endowments of any given economy. A 
growing literature emphasises that these interactions are themselves worthy of note 
(Edquist, 1997; Kolodko, 1999; Cassiolato and Lasters, 2000; Rasiah, 2008). However, our 
interest in this paper is not the causality of these interactions and their nature per se, but how 
they may act to promote or prevent knowledge accumulation and exploitation by industrial 
enterprises. We will build upon the literature on systems of innovation (SI), which has 
argued that the development of firm-level technological capabilities is the outcome of 
investment undertaken by the firm in response to external and internal stimuli (Lall 1992).  
That is, in addition to factors that are firm-specific, there are those that are common to firms 
in given countries depending on their policy regimes, skills and factor endowments, and 
institutional structures (See e.g., Lundvall, 1992; Edquist 1997). In other words, to examine 
the strength or weakness of firms, one must turn to understanding the underlying and 
complementary developments in their associated system (Criscuolo and Narula 2008).  We 
argue that institutions are subject to inertia when political and economic regimes are 
reformed, and the system as a whole – through its various interactions which are held 
together by institutions – may experience lock-in, causing industrial enterprises to engage in 
routines that generate a sub-optimal outcome.  
Following other scholars, we argue that the role of institutions (see e.g., Nelson and 
Winter 1982, North 1990) is crucial. The absence of efficient institutions can retard the 
efficient accumulation and transfer of knowledge between industrial enterprises and other 
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economic actors within their milieu, influencing growth in general (e.g., Rodrik 1999, 
Rodrik, et. al. 2004; Lall and Narula 2004;  Meyer and Peng, 2005;  Asiedu 2006). But we 
go further and argue that a fundamental shift from one political and/or economic regime or 
policy stance to another represents a discontinuity or ‘shock’ to the system, and this can play 
havoc with both formal and informal institutions. There is often a strong institutional inertia 
which must be overcome, whether this shift is as fundamental as experienced by the former 
centrally planned economies during their transition, or from an import-substituting stance to 
a more open, export-oriented one, as experienced by many developing countries, the 
difference being only one of degree (Neuber 1993, Narula 2003).  
The remainder of paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical 
premises of the paper and discusses from the system of innovation point of view problems 
of institutional inertia and lock-in. Section 3 describes the specific features of pre-transition 
model of SI and challenges of its transformation towards a conventional model suitable for 
market economies. Section 4 provides an empirical illustration of the developed theoretical 
argument in the empirical context of Russian transition economy. Section 5 presents the 
conclusions of the research. 
 
2. Theoretical underpinning of the paper 
2.1. Systems of innovation and role of institutions 
Economic growth occurs due to the ability of a nation’s industries to develop and sustain 
their competitive position which requires growth of productivity of its capital and labour. 
Economic growth concerns not just the development of knowledge through innovation, but 
also the diffusion of knowledge such that it may be utilized and exploited in an efficient 
manner. In other words, accumulated technology is an engine of growth only if it can be 
harnessed to make the best use of the available resources, and therefore must also consist of 
the knowledge to organise transactions efficiently, whether intra-firm, intra-industry or 
intra-market. The point here is that ownership-specific assets of economic units– be they 
technological in the narrow sense, or organisational – all share the common characteristics 
that they are cumulative, and evolve over time.  
Economic actors – be they firms or individuals – acquire knowledge from the 
external environment by exploring in the vicinity of their existing knowledge assets, and 
internally by undertaking routines, which leads to incremental innovations. In particular, 
external knowledge is acquired by firms through interaction (inter alia) with customers, 
suppliers, competitors, and government agencies. Firms are generally averse to radical 
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change (as are individuals, who make up firms), in that they are likely to ‘stay close’ to 
patterns of behaviour, learning and interaction which have been successful in the past. 
Another important factor in understanding the dynamics of knowledge accumulation 
is that these evolutionary processes do not occur in a vacuum. That is, firms do not make 
decisions about the kinds of products they will seek to develop, nor where they intend to 
develop and produce these goods and services, based simply on firm-specific issues and 
profit maximising motives. Firms exist as part of ‘systems’, much as individuals exist as 
part of society. They are embedded through historical, social, political and economic ties to 
other economic units. 
Firms are also constrained in the kinds of knowledge competences they can acquire 
and internalise by the extent of their absorptive capabilities (Cohen and Levinthal 1990). It 
takes years to develop new competences, and to achieve a level of expertise that will 
provide them with a technological advantage to be a front-runner. The skills to acquire and 
successfully internalise external assets are non-trivial. In other words, firms are constrained 
in what they can learn by what they know. 
Understanding the systems’ view of an economy and the underlying dynamics of 
learning helps us to comprehend the creation of competitive advantage both at the industry 
and national levels. It also – if one takes a linear and developmental view of technological 
accumulation and innovation systems – helps us to understand how industrial development 
occurs. Systems always exist, but they do not always result in an efficient outcome in the 
sense that firms in that location are able to sustain an advantage. Furthermore, systems may 
be ‘incomplete’ or ‘unbalanced’ because some aspects of the systems are inefficient, or 
simply non-existent. Nor, even where an efficient, complete and balanced system exists, 
does this imply that this will continue ad infinitum.  
It is important to realise that few countries have truly ‘national’ systems. Of course, 
some innovation systems are more national than others, and the term is indicative rather 
than definitive. For instance, smaller countries’ innovation systems may have a larger 
dependence on non-national actors. However, by and large, most economic actors within an 
innovation system have a growing interdependence on economic actors outside their 
national boundaries (Narula 2003). It is safe to say that prior to transition, the centrally 
planned economies were much more ‘national’ and self-contained, as were the import-
substituting economies to a lesser extent.   
The innovation system concept suggests that there exist certain structural influences 
(scientific, political, and socio-economic) within any nation state that help to define the 
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pattern, nature and extent of knowledge accumulation within a given industry, which also 
define the extent and nature of industrial innovation within its borders. Technological 
specialisation patterns are distinct across countries, despite the economic and technological 
convergence associated with economic globalisation (Archibugi and Pianta, 1992; Narula, 
1996). Other studies have shown that these patterns of technological specialisation are fairly 
stable over long periods (see Cantwell, 1989; Zander, 1995) and change only very gradually.   
-------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
--------------------------------- 
 
 Figure 1 gives a stylised version of a conventional national innovation system. An SI 
approach essentially allows us to map the complex interactions between a firm and its 
environment. The environment consists, firstly, of interactions between firms—especially 
between a firm and its network of customers and suppliers. Secondly, the environment 
involves broader factors shaping the behaviour of firms: the social, political and cultural 
context; the institutional and organisational framework; infrastructures; the processes which 
create and distribute scientific knowledge, and so on.  There are two groups of economic 
actors in the system. The first group includes firms – private and public – engaged in 
innovatory activity. The second group consists of non-firm sector that determines the 
knowledge infrastructure that supplements and supports firm-specific innovation. We define 
‘knowledge infrastructure’ in the sense proposed by Smith (1997) as being ‘generic, multi-
user and indivisible’ and consisting of public research institutes, universities, organisations 
for standards, intellectual property protection, etc. that enables and promotes science and 
technology development. For simplicity, we can broadly define the non-firm sector as 
consisting of (1) A public R&D sector including various organizations conducting R&D 
activities; (2) An education sector consisted of universities, institutes and other 
organizations providing training and education. 
 The interactions between the various actors within a system are governed by 
institutions.  Institutions are the ‘glue’ that bind the various actors together, and determine 
the efficacy of their interaction (or lack thereof).  Institutions are taken here to be of two 
types, informal and formal, and are generally understood as ‘sets of common habits, 
routines, established practises, rules, or laws that regulate the interaction between 
individuals and groups’ (Edquist and Johnson 1997). Institutions create the milieu within 
which all economic activity is undertaken and establish the ground rules for interaction 
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between the various actors. We take formal institutions to include the appropriate 
intellectual property rights regime, competition policy, the creation of technical standards, 
taxation, the establishment of incentives and subsidies for innovation, the funding of 
education, etc. They are codified and administered by organisations which are themselves 
formal institutions since their existence is formally defined, and their structures are designed 
to create and implement new and existing formal institutions2. Formal institutions are 
generally politically defined and legally binding rules, regulations and organisations. 
Indeed, the political and economic spheres are rarely independent, and this is all the more so 
where a high degree of central planning was undertaken, whether in developing countries 
that had implemented import substitution programmes, or in the former centrally planned 
economies. In general, the policy environment in which economic actors function has a high 
degree of interdependency between the economic and political spheres. 
To modify and develop informal institutions is a complex and slow process, 
particularly since they cannot be created simply by government fiat. Perhaps the most 
important aspect of informal institutions is the ‘know-who’ (Narula 2002). It takes 
considerable effort to create informal networks of government agencies, suppliers, 
politicians, researchers, and once created, they have a low marginal cost of maintaining. For 
an outsider, the high costs of becoming familiar with, and integrating into, a new system 
may be prohibitive (Narula 2003).  For an insider, however, such membership comes with 
privileges which provide opportunities for rent generation3.  
Informal institutions are rarely codified. They are also necessary for creating and promoting 
links between the various actors, and are closely tied to norms and values, and represent 
routines which are essential to the implementation of formal institutions. To modify and 
develop informal institutions is a complex and slow process, particularly since they cannot 
be created simply by government fiat. For an outsider, such as an MNE, the high costs of 
becoming familiar with and integrating into a new location may be prohibitive (Narula 
2003).  For an insider, however, such membership comes with privileges which provide 
opportunities for rent generation. Indeed, more recent work on informal institutions – which 
are notoriously difficult to quantify – point to the absence or inefficiency of institutions as a 
primary force inhibiting economic development (e.g., Rodrik 1999; Rodrik, et. al., 2004, 
Asiedu, 2006).  
                                               
2
 North (1990) differentiates institutions from organisations. However, as explained here, organisations can 
themselves be institutions.  
3
 The literature on network theory provides a useful discussion on the complexities of interaction with informal 
institutions.  
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2.2. The challenges of institutional inertia and lock-in 
Since informal institutions are very imprecise in nature and are harder to measure and 
quantify, there has been a tendency for policy makers and the academics to underemphasise 
their importance, focusing instead on formal institution building. This has included 
promulgating new laws, reducing corruption, improving the regulatory apparatus, creating 
monetary and fiscal institutions, strengthening corporate governance, enhancing the 
functioning of the legal system. However, informal institutions are not so easy to change, 
partly because the formal and informal institutions are inextricably locked together – 
organizations that must implement changes in formal policy are also the custodians and the 
creators of the informal institutions that are required to be modified. As Johnson (1994, p. 
973) explains in her evaluation of the problems of reforming the Russian banking system: 
 
Even in crisis the old institutions remain and must continue to function in order to 
prevent a complete atomization of society. In such a crisis period, then, the structure 
and practices of the old institutions will have a fundamental impact on the way in 
which the institutions react and adapt to the new circumstances…. Large gaps 
almost always exist between legislated changes from above and their 
implementation by the institutions affected by these changes…. Something is 
regularly lost or altered in the translation, and the institutions themselves determine 
exactly what these ‘somethings’ will be… Those wishing to abolish existing 
institutions often find that they must settle for changing them slowly and painfully.  
 
In other words, systems are bound by institutional inertia, because formal and informal 
institutions constrain and pre-determine what firms and governments can and cannot do 
(Hannan and Freeman 1984).To paraphrase the concept of inertia in the current context: 
industrial enterprises will prefer to maintain existing institutions with competitors, 
customers and external organisations, produce similar products and remain in similar 
locations, unless an external force is applied. That is, they prefer to maintain their current 
state of equilibrium, if it does not threaten their survival. It is worth emphasising that inertia 
as a concept is neither ‘positive’ nor ‘negative’. The reluctance to change is a state of nature 
and always exists. Inertia is even required and depended upon, as it is the basis for stability, 
accountability and reliability within any system. Stable institutions are an essential condition 
to reduce uncertainty in any environment (Peng 2002, 2003). 
When a large external ‘shock’ is applied – a change in the economic and political 
milieu, by legal and governmental fiat - actors will seek in the first instance to continue to 
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use the institutions and routines with which they are familiar, even where they no longer 
provide efficient returns. Oliver (1992) shows that even when change is recognized by 
firms, it may be immobilized by the previous institutional arrangement.  Actors loathe 
radical change. Radical change is costly and highly risky, and because routines and 
institutions develop slowly, radical change that is undertaken rapidly is even more risky 
(Narula 2003). Thus, inertia in transition between two different economic systems implies a 
‘lag’ between adapting informal institutions in response to a change in the formal 
institutions. The lack of congruity between the formal and informal aspects of institutions 
means that reform will lack legitimacy as long as there is a void between the formal and 
informal aspects (Neuber 1993), and especially so where the new institutions are not native 
to the domestic environment (Palma, 1991).  
Inertia can be a pervasive phenomenon at the level of a whole economy, because 
often there is a self-reinforcing interaction between industrial enterprises, the infrastructure 
and politics which perpetuates the use of specific technologies, production of specific 
products, and/or through specific processes, and specific customer-supplier associations. 
Political reform resulting in economic reform may act as an external shock, forcing 
wholesale changes in the formal institutions which are incompatible with the informal 
institutions. The situation is exacerbated when elements of the industrial system and its 
associated infrastructure are either shrunk, or transferred to the control of another branch of 
the economy, or are obliged for other reasons to alter their raison d’etre. Such institutional 
restructuring is not an instantaneous or costless process and results in inefficient outcomes. 
Institutions developed for, or specialised around, a particular economic system or industrial 
cluster are not efficient in responding to the needs of another. In the case of the import-
substituting countries institutional inertia was at a much smaller scale, often associated with 
a few selected industries built around national champions. In the transition economies, this 
was on a much larger scale, covering almost all aspects of economic activity. 
An important source of institutional inertia derives from the paradox that when 
radical reform is implemented, formal institutions are both the objects and the agents for 
change (Johnson, 1994). The ‘insiders’ who represent both key members of formal 
governmental organisations as well as more informal interest groups often have much to 
lose from reform and actively resist change, either because of potential adverse effects on 
their status or their ability to derive rents . As Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) show, there is a 
bias towards the status quo, even where it is inefficient. In the case of Russia, Dyker (2000) 
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argues that the continued dominance of insiders and their resistance to implementing reform 
have been the main cause for economic stagnation.  
 
2.3. When inertia results in lock-in 
Interaction within an SI is a self-reinforcing mechanism which may or may not lead to ex 
post efficiency. That is, a single dominant paradigm of interactions built around specific 
relationships between economic actors that are supported by specific institutions may 
prevail which may or may not be the most optimal set of associations. In essence, actors are 
structurally locked-in to specific institutions, locations, actors and products/technologies. 
Lock-in represents a self-reinforcing interaction between firms and infrastructure 
perpetuating the use of routines. This often results from increased specialisation because of 
structural inertia (Hannan and Freeman 1984; Hannan, et. al. 2002).  
Lock-in (as with inertia) can be a ‘positive’ if a virtuous relationship that sustains or 
improves the competitiveness of firms exists between parties within an SI. This may be 
because the SI provides the best resources and opportunities on a global level, or because 
the industry is purely a domestic one. Institutions develop, support and reinforce the 
interwoven relationship between firms and the knowledge infrastructure through positive 
feedback. However, a negative outcome from lock-in is also possible where there is 
systemic lock-in such that the SI cannot respond to, or adapt to, external shocks due to 
radical shifts in the technological, economic or political paradigms.  
Over-specialisation of knowledge infrastructure to meet the specific needs of a 
specialised cluster can also lead to ex post inefficiencies. Firm-infrastructure relations can 
be so closely interdependent that the boundaries and functions of firms and the various 
components of the knowledge infrastructure are unclear, and de facto operate as one large 
unit. Grabher (1993) illustrates how the myopia generated by systemic lock-ins4 led to the 
decline of the Ruhr area in Germany.  
In the next section, we illustrate this argument in the empirical context of transition 
economies. In order to do so, we briefly discuss a general model of SI in centrally planned 
economies.  
 
 
 
                                               
4
 Grabher does not use the term ‘systemic lock-in’ but refers to three simultaneous lock-ins: functional lock-in, 
cognitive lock-in and political lock-in. 
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3.  A stylised systems of innovation model in a centrally planned economy  
Figure 2 shows the stylised version of pre-transition SI model. Prior to economic reforms, 
transition economies had a largely domestic innovation system where knowledge sources 
were determined primarily by domestic elements (Radosevic 1999, 2003). The technological 
development trajectory had been planned centrally in response to state-defined priorities. 
Likewise, domestic governmental organisations formulated domestic industrial policy, 
which in turn determined domestic industrial structure. National non-firm actors also 
defined the kinds of skills that the local labour force might possess; the kinds of 
technologies that these actors had appropriate expertise in; the kinds of technologies in 
which basic and applied research was conducted, and thereby, the industrial specialisation 
and competitive advantages of the firm sector. FDI was non-existent in those countries prior 
the transition era and any linkages to international sources were sporadic and state 
controlled.  
----------------------------------- 
Insert figure 2 about here 
------------------------------------ 
Figure 2 indicates that the other important feature of SI in centrally planned 
economies was the extensive and pervasive coordination between actors, when the one-way 
information flows in the forms of plans and directives existed between the state and the 
other actors of the system. The change, which took place after the beginning of economic 
reforms, was dramatic in respect of scale and speed (Peng, 2003).  
FDI in the centrally planned era was non-existent, and thus, the presence of foreign 
MNEs was a novel phenomenon in post-transition years. Local actors in many instances 
were reluctant to integrate MNEs into the system (Damijan, et.al., 2003; Yudaeva et al, 
2003; Sinani and Meyer, 2004; Javorcik and Spatareanu, 2008). Although some countries 
such as Hungary and the Czech Republic responded successfully to radical changes in their 
industrial structure, the response of most of the former soviet states was considerably less 
successful. The primary difference between these two groups essentially reflected in a 
fundamentally different policy stance, where some countries maintained the basic principle 
of domestic firm-led industrialisation, while others moved to a MNE-led development 
strategy (Radosevic, 2006). Largely speaking the latter group modified their institutions and 
attempted to redesign their SIs around the ‘conventional’ market economy model, with 
varying degrees of success (Radosevic, 2006). The former soviet states largely maintained 
their original SI focused around traditional areas of competence and dominant economic 
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actors. This often reflected the extent to which there was a political imperative and a popular 
sentiment to distance themselves from the pre-transition dependence on the Soviet Union 
and realign their economies with the European Union.  In other words, the ability of 
different economies to transition reflected the strength of the existing institutional 
arrangements and the political will to implement reforms (Newman 2000). Roth and 
Kostova (2003) argue that the variation in firms’ responses in transition economies can be 
explained by the gap between the existing and desired institutional arrangements, in part 
determined by the strength and pervasiveness of the institutional arrangements that existed 
prior to radical change. In cases such as Russia, economic transformation deepened the 
deficiencies inherited from the pre-transition SI, and the mixture of changes in incentives 
structures played a negative role in the innovation processes in indigenous firms.  
On the one hand, institutional transformation faced a significant degree of inertia 
when local actors were not able to respond efficiently to the challenges of reforms. On the 
other, government failed to create and develop appropriate institutions supporting the 
organizational transformation of local firms, and this was not helped by the reluctance of 
interest groups to implement change. Therefore, the failure took place at two levels: at the 
performance level and at the policy level. The next section will elaborate in greater details 
the inertia in transformation of the Soviet SI towards the conventional model of SI in 
Russia. 
 
4. Evidence from Russia 
This section aims to demonstrate in the empirical context of Russian economy and the 
challenges of transformation of the Soviet S&T system towards conventional SI. Our 
analysis is based on two types of empirical information. The first is primary data acquired 
by conducting personal interviews with top managers of Russian industrial enterprises and 
foreign MNEs with production activities in Russia.  We asked respondents in selected 
Russian companies to describe in detail the obstacles in the external environment hindering 
the development of their capabilities and competitiveness. Also, we asked the respondents’ 
opinion regarding the possible actions to overcome existing problems. We interviewed both 
‘new’ and ‘old’ types of Russian enterprises which allowed for the comprehensive analysis 
of the problems existing in Russian firm sector.  Further, the discussion with foreign MNEs 
provided the opportunity to understand the perspective of foreign actors on the same set of 
issues discussed with the Russian enterprises.  
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After the interview data was analyzed, we collected secondary data aiming to support 
respondents’ statements with more objective evidence. Hence, we acquired a large amount 
of statistical information on Soviet Science and Technology (S&T) and Russian SI from the 
Russian Statistics Office and academic publications which was used in the study as a 
complementary source of empirical evidence. 
 
4.1. The organization of the Soviet science and technology system  
The most important feature of the Soviet S&T system was the strong role of state in 
coordinating activities of all the actors in the system. The state defined the priorities for 
development of science and education, allocated funds, and coordinated the implementation 
of the plans. Figure 3 illustrates the structure of the Soviet S&T system which was highly 
hierarchical in nature and where ultimate authority belong to the Communist Party 
determining the directions for the development of S&T system on the basis of its ideological 
principles. Specifically, the Soviet S&T system had two main sectors, namely the R&D 
sector and the education sector, which were governed by the Council of Ministries (Figure 
3). 
------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
------------------------------------------- 
The R&D sector consisted of three groups of organizations.  
1. The first group were organizations which were under administration of the Soviet 
Academy of Science and consisted of a number of large Research Institutes 
performing the basic research, such as the Space Research Institute and the Institute 
of Applied Mathematics.  
2. The second group of organizations of R&D sector consisted of Ministries for 
branches of National Economy such as e.g. Aviation, Machine Building, and 
Nuclear Industry. The Ministry of each industrial branch had its own R&D units 
which were concentrated to a large extent on performing applied research and 
development. In particular, as shown in Figure 3, this part of R&D sector included  
a. construction bureaus concentrating on the new product planning and 
development functions; 
b. small- and medium-size research institutes conducting research and 
development functions;  
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c. project-based organizations conducting a range of functions depending on the 
project;  
d. experimental plants whose activities were mostly restricted to the product 
testing functions (Figure 3).  
These organizations represented a major part of Soviet R&D sector. About 90% 
of all scientific activities were concentrated in industrial branches, which was the 
distinctive feature of the organization of R&D sector.  
3.  The third group of organizations were coordinated by the Ministry of Education. 
These units mostly conducted basic research. 
 
The coordination of activities of all these organizations and distribution of financial 
resources took place according to the ‘top-down’ principle as indicated the by the direction 
of arrows in the Figure 3. The Communist Party defined the priorities for R&D activities, 
which were further communicated to Academy of Science and Ministries, which, in turn, 
were responsible for detailed planning and implementation and for the allocation of specific 
tasks to various organizations in the R&D sector. Then, as a result of coordination at the 
Ministries level, the tasks of the research projects were normally divided between various 
organizations according to their specialization.  
A distinctive feature of the Soviet S&T system was that the organization of the R&D 
sector required a high level of coordination between organizations involved in the project. It 
was not uncommon that several research institutes, construction bureaus and experimental 
plants might be involved in the process of development and testing of a product. Hence, 
Figure 4 provides a graphical illustration of the intricate network of organizations involved 
in innovation.  In particular, construction bureaus and research institutes were responsible 
for new product development; the experimental plants were responsible for its 
standardisation and test- manufacturing. Only after these steps would production be shifted 
to the industrial enterprises responsible for large scale production.  
------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 4 about here 
------------------------------------------- 
It is important to emphasize that industrial enterprises did not engage in R&D 
themselves, and their activities were limited to the mass production function. They normally 
received the already developed technological knowledge from other R&D organizations in a 
form suitable for the manufacturing of the final products (Figure 4).  
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The production process itself was organized according to the five-year plans defined 
by the state, which clearly defined how much output was expected from each enterprise. 
Initiative at this stage was discouraged, as managers were keen to avoid missing targets, 
since they were often personally responsible for achieving their targets. In this type of 
environment, industry lacked both the stimuli and the capabilities for development of new 
technologies and better quality products. Sales of output were also known well in advance, 
and were carefully matched with supply at fixed prices that were not always related to their 
actual value. This practice further undermined the impetus to improve the quality of the 
products and modernize the production facilities. 
Linkages from the ‘bottom to the top’ also existed in the Soviet S&T system, 
primarily in the planning process. All actors had to communicate back to the higher 
authorities how they planned to achieve their output, and specify the kinds of inputs and 
resources they would need to achieve their targets (Figure 3). This communication allowed 
the higher authorities to exercise a tight control over the industrial sector and inhibited any 
flexibility in the activities of the soviet enterprises.  
To summarize, this structure of R&D sector had several serious drawbacks. First, 
innovative activities were concentrated outside the industrial enterprises which were highly 
dependent on the intricate network of institutes and construction bureaus for development of 
their products. Soviet enterprises functioned as mere production units, and lacked 
motivation to conduct serious R&D activities. Technological knowledge produced in R&D 
organizations was not linked directly to consumer needs and was partly responsible for the 
low level of consumer goods development in the Soviet Union.  
Second, the Soviet R&D sector was its highly bureaucratic and political nature 
where priorities for development were defined by the higher authorities, and the practice of 
interests lobbying by R&D organizations and research groups was particularly common. 
Funds for development of certain scientific projects were received on the basis of the 
strength of ties between R&D organizations and the Soviet party, rather than being based on 
project competition. This feature has been inherited by Russian R&D sector. As one of the 
respondent stated:  
 
“There is such a concept as lobbying of the interests… It has been inherited from the Soviet 
times when, in order to get a state order for one’s own construction bureaus, various means 
were used by the Head of the Bureau to influence the decision [of the politicians]”.  
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Third, most R&D units had little or no management staff and were administered by 
leading researchers appointed by the Communist party who were responsible for such tasks 
as distribution of funds, definition of priorities for the future research, and scientific 
publications.  
The third part of the S&T system was the education sector which was represented by 
the institutes providing secondary and tertiary education. They were mainly responsible for 
the supply of qualified graduates for all sectors of economy, and, to some extent, performed 
basic research, financed entirely by the state. As Figure 3 shows, the Ministry of Education 
was in charge of all educational organizations, and was authorized to define the 
nomenclature of specialties according to the expected needs of the national economy. These 
needs were defined 5-10 years ahead, and certain quotas for new graduates were defined on 
the basis of the demand in each industrial sector and approved centrally. Consequently, 
according to those quotas, a certain number of students were accepted to educational 
organizations of different levels. This type of coordination allowed for a balanced structure 
of new graduates, who, were placed in industrial enterprises of the appropriate 
specialization.  Therefore, the Soviet system of education was able to produce a required 
number of specialists for all branches of the national economy. This had the advantage of 
stability, but it also meant that new disciplines and subject areas were not easily catered for. 
To conclude, the main characteristics on Russian S&T system were (1) a high degree 
of state coordination and control which often had a political nature and was highly 
bureaucratic; (2) a low R&D activity in industrial enterprises, and (3)  underdeveloped links 
with western scientific world which slowed the pace of the technical progress and 
development of new advanced technologies.  
 
4.2. Transition period  
First phase of reforms, 1992-1995 
The first years of transition were a very hard time for Russian science when the state 
priorities were oriented towards other national needs, and R&D and education sectors faced 
severe competition for the budgeted funds. These sectors were excluded from the priorities 
of the government development policy due to the fact that other problems such as financial 
stabilization, inflation were the main focus of the government attention. The overall 
negative background existing in the national economy and the significant decline of 
industrial output decreased the incentives and resources of all actors in the economy to 
conduct R&D activities.  
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Table 1 gives the share of industrial output in industry in 1995 as a percentage from 
1991, and shows that the most significant fall in production occurred in consumer goods and 
machine building industries, where the share of output in 1995 was 18.5 per cent and 41.1 
per cent correspondingly compared to that in 1991. The energy sector was protected to a 
large extent, where the decrease in output was much less significant and was sustained at the 
level of 82 per cent.  
------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------------------- 
During this turbulent time the Russian government has significantly reduced its 
research and development (R&D) funding as part of the restructuring and downsizing of 
Russia’s R&D system and its reorientation towards civilian R&D. The principle of the 
science funding changed: before the transition period it was a high priority in state spending 
whereas after the start of reforms funds to the R&D sector were limited. In 1992 the state 
finance of science has decreased in 2.2 times compare to 1991 (Dezhina, 1997). As Table 2 
indicates, in 1991 there were 100% state-owned R&D organizations whereas in 1995 only 
29.4% were owned by the state (Statistical yearbook of Russia, 2007). However, the overall 
number of these organizations decreased only by 12.4 per cent from 4564 in 1991 to 4059 in 
1995 which can be explained by the fact that some large organizations such as research 
institutes were broken-down into smaller independent organizations which were managed 
by small teams of scientists.  
------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 2 about here 
------------------------------------------- 
As illustrated in Table 2, the most significant downsizing took place in number of 
construction bureaus and project-based organizations. In 1991 construction bureaus and 
project-based organization represented 20.4% and 12.2% of the total number of R&D 
organizations respectively. By 1995 the corresponding numbers were 13.3% and 1.6%. 
Some of these organizations simply did not survive transition, although some were 
privatized and started to undertake various (non-state directed) commercial activities in 
order to get additional financial resources. In particular, many construction bureaus and 
research institutes were transformed into manufacturing units (e.g. Antonov Construction 
Bureau).   
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Overall, these processes had a strong negative influence on the innovative 
capabilities of Russian industrial enterprises which were closely cooperating with these 
organizations for the development of new products. Thus, the most negative consequence of 
the downsizing of S&T system on the overall innovation network was not the decrease in 
the number of organizations as such, but the manner in which they were eliminated, and the 
consequences this had on the overall innovation network. Each of the organizations had its 
rather specialised functions in the coordinated state network.  As a number of players were 
made to ‘exit’ the field, the chain of innovative activities and the consequent level of output 
was severely compromised. This in turn put an additional pressure on the remaining 
organizations which were forced to perform a much wider range of activities and establish 
new networks of partners. As one of the respondents stated:  
 
“In Soviet times 5-6 construction bureaus were doing the same volume which now does one 
bureau and one enterprise”.  
 
Hence, Figure 5 shows many organizations and, consequently, linkages between them 
disappeared which was resulted in inefficient functioning of the whole R&D sector.  
 
------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 5 about here 
------------------------------------------- 
The downsizing of the number of organization in R&D sector has also resulted in the 
decrease in the number of scientific staff. Table 3 indicates that number of researchers and 
scientists in 1995 decreased by 58.7 per cent compare to the level of 1991. This fact 
supports the point suggested previously that although the number of organizations did not 
change dramatically, the real scale of activities conducted in R&D sector decreased 
significantly. 
------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 3 about here 
------------------------------------------- 
Also, according to the information provided by Statistical Yearbook of Russia 
(2007), the decrease in personnel was the most significant in technical sciences with a much 
smaller decrease in the humanities and social sciences. The explanation for this situation is 
that Soviet science was technically oriented, and the humanities and social sciences were not 
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included into the state development priorities. However, after transition the lack of qualified 
staff in these areas was realized and more resources have begun to be directed there. 
In the education sector, during first years of transition only 40 per cent of costs were 
covered by the state (Dezhina, 1997), and organizations gained a high degree of autonomy 
and were allowed to define independently their range of specialties, the number of students 
and the content of educational programs. These changes had a significant influence on the 
structure of education and, to a certain extent, on its quality. Due to the fact that in the 
Soviet Union the education was to the large extent technically oriented there was a lack of 
graduates in humanities and social sciences, especially in economics and law. Hence, during 
the transition to market economy there was an acute need for specialists in such fields as 
management, marketing and law, as well as other various services areas. Thus, the education 
sector has started a massive reorientation of the educational programs. However, on the 
negative side, the growth of these new specialties often took place at the expense of the 
closure of others technical specialties. New programs in these fields were also cheaper to 
implement since they did not require the expensive training equipment as in the case of 
engineering specialties which was a serious issue in the situation of limited financial 
resources. As it has been mentioned by an interviewee:  
 
“Technical colleges were transferred to the regional supervision which meant in practice 
that many of them re-oriented their educational programs from technical specialties 
requiring expensive teaching materials (e.g. class rooms equipped with new equipment for 
practice) towards educational programs in services such as e.g. hairdressers, restaurant 
staff, etc., where education process is much more easy and cheaper to organize”. 
 
This statement emphasizes the fact that a mismatch has appeared between the 
professions taught in educational organizations of all levels and industry needs. Table 4 
shows the change in the number of professional training graduates and supports the 
respondents’ statement that the number of qualified factory floor workers has decreased 
significantly in the post-soviet time. Hence, in 2000 the total number of graduates fell by 
53.4 per cent compare to the level of 1994. Further, such sectors as machine building and 
metal processing had experienced the most dramatic decrease which was 251.3 per cent and 
158.6 per cent correspondingly (Table 4). 
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------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 4 about here 
------------------------------------------- 
Second phase of reforms, 1995-2007: slow recovery 
After the few first years of transition, the Russian government managed to undertake some 
actions towards the stabilization of the science and technology sector and its further 
transformation into conventional type SI suitable for market economy. However, although 
various changes in formal policies regulating the SI functioning were made, the ministerial 
principal in the coordination of SI was preserved from the pre-transition time.  
Figure 6 shows the stylised version of new Russian SI and illustrates the result of the 
transformation, and the change in the nature of the links between various actors of SI. 
------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 6 about here 
------------------------------------------- 
The important feature of the new system was the establishment of new types of 
organizations in each of sectors of the SI. First, at the higher level, a number of budget and 
non-budget funds was established in order to finance R&D and education sectors. These 
funds did not belong to any of the Ministries, and their resources were distributed on the 
basis of an open project competition.  Thus, these funds represented a new form of selective 
state support. Further, foreign sources of capital were now available and foreign investors 
became increasingly interested in the cooperation with Russian scientists. These various 
funds allocated grants for the financing of scientific projects and for the support of 
prospective students in leading institutes and universities.  
In the R&D sector, small innovative enterprises appeared whose activities were 
primarily focused on the implementation of applied research and commercialization of 
innovations. Also, technology parks and science cities (naukogrady) established in the 
Soviet era were reoriented and adjusted to new economic conditions. However, the number 
of enterprises decreased over the transition period (Dezhina, 2004). Among the major 
obstacles were underdeveloped infrastructure in the area of technology commercialization; 
incomplete and misleading legislation; lack of financial resources.  
In the higher education sector a large number of private universities were established 
whose activities were financed entirely by their own funds. Table 5 shows the number of 
organizations of higher education illustrates the rapid growth of private universities from 
193 in 1995 to 430 in 2006.  
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------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 about here 
------------------------------------------- 
Lastly, in the enterprise sector, a large number of companies with foreign (both full 
or partial) ownership was established during both the first and the second phase of transition 
(Figure 6).  
It is worth emphasizing that although the nature of relationships between actors 
within the SI changed, it did not change completely. There have been different types of 
responses at the organizational level to the changing conditions of the external environment, 
when some organizations succeeded to establish efficient bilateral links with other actors of 
SI joining their efforts in the creation and development of innovations. Figure 6 shows two-
way arrows indicating the existence of close cooperation between some successful (‘new’ 
type) enterprises and organizations of R&D sector. However, large number of (‘old’ type) 
companies  failed to re-structure their activities, or re-establish links with other actors.    
Nonetheless, the overall structure of innovative activities did not change 
significantly, and the increase in R&D activities performed by industry was not noticeable. 
Table 6 provides data on the Gross Expenditure on R&D by the performer in 1995-2004, 
and clearly indicates that the change in R&D activities conducted by industrial enterprises 
was marginal, from 68.5 per cent in 1995 to 69.1 per cent in 2004. Moreover, the 
government remains the main source of R&D funding. Table 7 shows the data on Gross 
Expenditure on R&D by the finding source, where the share of government remains 
significantly large and represents 60.6 per cent in 2004.  
------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 6 about here 
------------------------------------------- 
------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 7 about here 
------------------------------------------- 
 
The continuing challenge of institutional inertia in the Russian SI  
The discussion here has indicated that a large part of Russian SI failed to overcome 
structural inertia after the start of economic reforms and to adopt new practices in their 
activities.  The Russian enterprise sector still faces numerous problems in promoting 
innovatory activities necessary for manufacturing. According to the interviewees, a large 
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number of modern Russian enterprises still do not have an internal R&D unit. The point 
here is that in reality the government tools did not work as efficiently as it was expected, 
and new practices were not adopted by the majority of actors in the SI, and the state was 
either unwilling or unable to implement important changes to the formal institutions.  
Moreover, many enterprises remain lumbered with technologically and physically 
old equipment and production facilities which are no longer suitable or efficient. The 
inefficient organization of production processes has increased production costs despite the 
fact that labour costs are still at a relatively low level. Formal policies developed over the 
last two decades have, thus far, failed to create incentives for undertaking innovation 
activities and the modernization of industrial sectors, as there has been little to motivate 
industrial enterprises to make long-term development plans require significant capital 
investments. After the beginning of transition, economic and political environment also 
became highly unstable which undermined local firms’ ability to make long-term plans. As 
one of the respondents pointed out: 
 
“At least during the Soviet Union times, we knew that as time goes we will achieve certain 
types of things such as establish a family, get and apartment and a summer house. But then 
at one point everything collapsed, and during the transition time it was very unclear what is 
going to happen which made it difficult to plan ahead and think about future’.   
 
 
Thus, investment policies of Russian enterprises are not focused towards long term 
goals, but aresurvival oriented. The disappearance of tight linkages between the various 
actors in the SI p has resulted in difficulties with finding appropriately qualified workers in 
certain technical specialties The President of an MNE stated:  
 
“There is catastrophic lack of working specializations, and not only working specialists but 
also technologists, constructors. Engineers are in very high demand, and the market for 
engineers is extremely tight in Russia. There is a lack of engineers, of accountants, HR 
managers. There is a lack of a lot of people”.  
 
However, there have been some positive changes and increasingly, private sources 
of finance from domestic and foreign investors are gaining in importance (Figure 6). In 
particular, indigenous companies seek various ways of cooperation with foreign investors 
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such as joint ventures, R&D projects, etc. This cooperation has been promoted by a gradual 
change in the attitude towards MNEs, and at a number of levels, appropriate policies to 
attract MNEs and stimulate the creation of linkages with local firms (e.g. the Saturn-Snecma 
joint venture for development and production of aircraft engines), which suggests that there 
is a potential in the future.  
 
5. Conclusions 
It has become increasingly clear that the capability to generate knowledge, provision of 
basic and advanced infrastructure and availability of a well-trained and skilled labour force 
are insufficient in themselves to promote industrial development and local firms’ 
competitiveness. This is especially obvious when examining the former centrally planned 
economies of central and eastern Europe and their inability to exploit their not-
inconsiderable science and technology base in a post-communist environment. Almost two 
decades later, some of these countries - such as Russia - have failed to demonstrate a 
discernible improvement in their industrial landscape whereas such laggard economies as 
China or India have succeeded in creating a vibrant and competitive domestic sector. This 
paper seeks to better understand the reasons for this discrepancy.  
We have taken a system of innovation approach and highlighted how the role of 
institutions and institutional inertia has impeded the process of transition. The resultant 
absence of strong linkages between various actors within the SI has negatively influenced 
the development of technological capabilities of local enterprises. Although the functions 
and roles of all actors have been defined by formal rules and policies, informal institutions 
have taken considerably longer to change, and in many instances, they have not yet been 
adapted in an efficient manner.  
We have emphasised that the political and economic spheres are highly inter-related 
and political and economic reform are often inseparable. As Johnson (1994, 2001) has 
stressed, institutions are highly resilient, and in the Russian case, have demonstrated 
incredible stability over the last century, despite several radical changes in the political and 
economic regime. Firms are interdependent and co-dependent on other domestic economic 
actors.  These interactions between the various organizations determine informal institutions 
and the policies which have not only formed them – and with which they are most familiar – 
but which they have also helped create. This process can be a self-reinforcing mechanism 
that perpetuates the use of certain technologies and networks of suppliers, customers and 
collaborators.  Innovation systems change only very slowly and this can result in what 
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Hannan and Freeman (1984) describe as structural inertia, which in turn can lead to 
systemic lock-in. Both inertia and lock-in are the result of actors within the system acting 
for or against reform. In the case of Russia, insiders and interest groups have a vested 
interest in maintaining existing institutions and they impede radical change. This lends 
credence to the principle that gradual changes are more likely to result in longer lasting and 
more ingrained reform than when shock therapy is used (Fernandez and Rodrik 1991; 
Dewatripont and Roland 1992, Rodrik 1996; Peng 2003), except in cases where popular 
sentiment has been overwhelmingly behind fundamental reform.  
The example of Russia provides considerable evidence of this. Market forces did not 
result in the innovation system restructuring itself to a western style model, but a hybrid 
model. A significant segment of industry maintains a soviet style dependence on ‘top-down’ 
supply-driven allocation of resources and a reliance on external (and domestic) network of 
sources for innovation and capital. At the same time, ‘new’ industries have also evolved 
which undertake their own R&D, and utilise foreign sources of capital and technology, and 
determine their production activities on the basis of both demand and supply.  
 Similar challenges – albeit at a smaller scale – have also been faced by developing 
countries that have shifted from an import-substituting model to a more open, market 
economy. Liberalization (among other forces related to the Washington Consensus) has 
acted as a major ‘shock’ to the institutions within most of these countries, since it has 
introduced not just new economic actors (MNEs), but it has also required major 
restructuring of existing institutions (legal codes, political structures, policy orientation). 
Despite the view of the Washington Consensus, the sudden exposure of these economies to 
the vagaries of international competition will not necessarily facilitate their institutional 
setting. 
 28 
 
References: 
Aitkien, B. and Harrison, A. (1999). Do domestic firms benefit from direct foreign 
investment? Evidence from Venezuela, American Economic Review, 89/9: 605-618. 
Archibugi, D. and Pianta, M. (1992). The technological specialization of advanced 
countries. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht/Boston/London. 
Asiedu, E. (2006). Foreign Direct Investment in Africa: The role of natural resources, 
market size, government policy, institutions and political instability, World Economy, 
29/1: 63-77 
Bell, M. and A. Marin (2004). Where do FDI-related technology spillovers come from in 
emerging economies? An exploration in Argentina in the 1990s, European Journal of 
Development Research, 16: 653-686. 
Bell, M., and Pavitt, K. (1993). Technological accumulation and industrial growth: contrasts 
between developed and developing countries. Industrial and Corporate Change, 2/2: 157–
211. 
Bobilev, Y. (1997). Industrial decline in Russia: Structural characteristics, Working paper, 
Publications of The Institute for the Economy in Transition, Moscow. 
Buckley, P., Clegg, J., and Wang, C. (2002). The impact of inward FDI on the performance 
of Chinese manufacturing firms, Journal of International Business Studies, 38: 447-459. 
Cantwell, J. (1989). Technological innovation and multinational corporation. Blackwell: 
Oxford. 
Cassiolato, J.E. and Lasters, H. M. (2000). Local Systems of Innovation in Mercosur 
Countries, Industry and innovation, 7/1: 33-53.  
Caves, R.E. 1996. Multinational enterprise and economic analysis, 2nd ed., Cambridge: 
CUP. 
Cohen, W.M. and Levinthal, D.A. (1990). Absorptive capacity: a new perspective on 
learning and innovation, Administrative Science Quarterly; 35/2: 128-152.  
Criscuolo, P. and Narula, R. (2008). A novel approach to national technological 
accumulation and absorptive capacity: Aggregating Cohen and Levinthal, The European 
Journal of Development Research, 20/1: 56-73. 
Damijan, J. P., Knell, M., Majcen B., and Rojec M. (2003). The role of FDI, R&D 
accumulation and trade in transferring technology to transition countries: evidence from 
firm panel data for eight transition countries, Economic Systems, 27/2: 189-204. 
 29 
Dewatripont, M. and Roland, G. (1992). Economic reform and dynamic political 
constraints, The Review of Economic Studies, 59/ 4: 703-730    
Dezhina, I. (1997). Science in Russia during transition, Working paper, Publications of The 
Institute for the Economy in Transition, Moscow. 
Dezhina, I. (2004). Creating innovative infrastructure in Russia: government policy, 
Working for the 4S & EASST Conference. 
Dezhina, I. and Zashev, P. (2007). Linkages in innovation system in Russia – Current status 
and opportunities for Russian-Finnish collaboration, Working Paper, Electronic 
Publications of Pan-European Institute. 
Djankov; S. and B. Hoekman, (2000). Foreign investment and productivity growth in Czech 
enterprises, World Bank Economic Review, 14: 49-64. 
Dyker, D. A. (2000). The Structural Origins of the Russian Economic Crisis, Post-
Communist Economies; 12/1: 5-24 
Edquist, C. (1997). Systems of innovation, London and Washington: Pinter/Cassell 
Academic. 
Edquist, C. and Johnson, B. (1997). ‘Institutions and organisations in systems of 
innovation’, in C. Edquist (ed.) Systems of Innovation: Technologies, Institutions and 
Organizations. London and Washington: Pinter/Cassell Academic. 
Fernandez,  R. and Rodrik, D. (1991). Resistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in the 
Presence of Individual-Specific Uncertainty, American Economic Review 81/5. 
Figueiredo, P. N. (2003). Learning, capability accumulation and firms differences: evidence 
from latecomer steel companies in Brazil, Industrial and Corporate Change, 12/3: 607-
643. 
Grabher, G. (1993). The weakness of Strong Ties: The lock-in of the regional development 
in the Ruhr area, in Grabher, G. (ed.), The Embedded Firm, London: Routledge. 
Haddad, M. and Harrison, A. (1993). Are there positive spillovers from direct foreign 
investment? Evidence from panel data for Morocco, Journal of Development Economics 
42: 51-74. 
Hannan, M. and Freeman, J. (1984). Structural inertia and organizational change, American 
Sociological Review, 49: 149-164. 
Hannan, M. T., Laszlo, P., and Carroll, G. R. (2002). Structural inertia and organizational 
change revisited III: the evolution of organizational inertia, Research Papers Series No. 
1734.  
 30 
Javorcik, B. and Spatareanu, M. (2008). To share or not to share: Does local participation 
matter for spillovers from foreign direct investment? Journal of Development Economics, 
85: 194-217 
Johnson, J. E. (1994). The Russian Banking System: Institutional Responses to the Market 
Transition, Europe-Asia Studies, 46/6:  971-995. 
Johnson, J. E. (2001). Path Contingency in Postcommunist Transformations, Comparative 
Politics, 33/3: 253-274 
Kim, L. (1997). The dynamics of Samsung technological learning in semiconductors, 
California Management Review, 39/3: 86-100. 
Kolodko, (1999). Transition to a market economy and sustained growth. Implications for the 
post-Washington consensus, Communist and Post-Communist Studies 32/233–261. 
Konings, J. (2001). The effects of foreign direct investment on domestic firms: Evidence 
from firm-level panel data in emerging economies. Economics of Transition, 9/3: 619-
633. 
Lall, S. (1992). Technological capabilities and industrialization, World Development, 2:165-
186. 
Lall, S. and Narula, R. (2004). Foreign direct investment and its role in economic 
development: Do we need a new research agenda? in Narula, R. and Lall, S. (ed.) 
Understanding FDI-assisted economic development, London and New York: Routledge 
Lundvall, B. (1988): Innovation as an interactive process: from user-producer interaction to 
the national system of innovation. In: Dosi, G., Freeman, C., Nelson, R.R., Silverberg, G. 
and Soete, L. (Editors),Technical Change and Economic Theory. Frances Pinter, London. 
Lundvall, B. (1992). National systems of innovation. Towards theory of innovation and 
interactive learning, London and New York: Pinter. 
Marin, A. and Bell, M. (2006). Technology spillovers from Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI): the active role of MNC subsidiaries in Argentina in the 1990s, The Journal of 
Development Studies, 42/4: 678-697. 
Meyer, K.E. and Peng, M.W. (2005). ‘Probing Theoretically into Central and Eastern 
Europe: Transactions, resources, and institutions’, Journal of International Business 
Studies 36: 600-621. 
Meyer, K. E. and Sinani, E. (2008). When and Where does Foreign Direct Investment 
Generate Positive Spillovers? A Meta-Analysis, Conference paper for Sanjaya Lall 
Conference on Confronting the Challenges of Technology for Development: Experiences 
from the BRICS. 
 31 
 
Narula, R. (1996) Multinational Investment and Economic Structure, Routledge, London. 
Narula, R. (2002). Innovation systems and ‘inertia’ in R&D location: Norwegian firms and 
the role of systemic lock-in, Research Policy, 31: 795–816 
Narula, R. (2003). Globalization and technology. Interdependence, innovation systems and 
industrial policy. Polity. 
Narula, R. (2004). Understanding absorptive capacities in an “innovation system context”: 
consequences for development, Working paper. MERIT-Infonomics Research and 
Memorandum series.  
Nelson, R. R and Rosenberg, N. (1993). Technical innovation and national systems, in 
Nelson, (1993), 3-28. 
Nelson R. R. and Winter S. G. (1982). An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change, The 
Belknap Press Cambridge, and London. 
Newman, K. (2000). Organizational transformation during institutional upheaval. Academy 
of Management Review, 25: 602–619. 
Neuber, A. (1993). Towards a political economy of transition in Eastern Europe, Journal of 
International Development, 5/5: 511-530. 
North, D. (1990). Institutions, institutional change, and economic performance. New York: 
Norton.  
Oliver, C. (1992). The antecedents of deinstitutionalization. Organization Studies, 13: 563–
588. 
Palma, G. (1991). Legitimation from the top to civil society. Politico-cultural change in 
Eastern Europe, World Politics, 44: 49-81 
Peng, M. W. (2002). Towards an institution-based view of business strategy. Asia Pacific 
Journal of Management, 19: 251–267. 
Peng, M. W. (2003). Institutional transitions and strategic choices. Academy of 
Management Review, 28: 275–296. 
Peng, M. and Heath P. S. (1996). The growth of the firm in planned economies in transition: 
institutions, organizations and strategic choice, Academy of Management Review, 21/2: 
492-528. 
 32 
Radocevic, S. (1999). Transformation of science and technology systems into systems of 
innovation in Central and Eastern Europe: the emerging patterns and determinants, 
Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, 10: 277-320. 
Radocevic, S. (2003). Patterns of preservation, restructuring and survival: science and 
technology policy in Russia in post-Soviet era, 32: 1105-1124. 
Radosevic, S. (2006). Central and Eastern Europe between domestic and foreign led 
modernization, Working paper. 
Rasiah, R. (2008). Systemic Pillars and Technological Intensities in Automotive Firms in 
Brazil, India and South Africa, Conference paper for Sanjaya Lall Conference on 
Confronting the Challenges of Technology for Development: Experiences from the 
BRICS. 
Rodrik, D. (1999). The new global economy and developing countries: making openness 
work, Policy Essay nr. 24, Overseas Development Council, John Hopkins University 
Press, Washington, DC. 
Rodrik, D. (1996). Understanding Economic Policy Reform, Journal of Economic 
Literature, 34: 9-41 
Rodrik, D, Subramanian, A., and Trebbi, F. (2004). Institutions Rule: The Primacy of 
Institutions over Geography and Integration in Economic Development, Journal of 
Economic Growth, 9: 131-165. 
Rodriguez, F. and Rodrik, D. (2000). “Trade Policy and Economic Growth: A Skeptic’s 
Guide to the Cross-National Evidence,” in B. Bernanke and K. Rogoff, NBER 
Macroeconomics Annual 2000, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press. 
Roth, K., and Kostova, T. (2004) Organizational coping with institutional upheaval in 
transition economies, Journal of World Business, 38/ 4: 314-331. 
Statistical yearbook of Russia (1995). Publishing Centre “Statistics of Russia”, Moscow 
Statistical yearbook of Russia (2007). Publishing Centre “Statistics of Russia”, Moscow 
Sinani, E. and Meyer, K. (2004). Spillovers from technology transfer: The case of Estonia. 
Journal of Comparative Economics, 32: 445-66. 
Smarzynska, B. (2004). "Does Foreign Direct Investment Increase the Productivity of 
Domestic Firms? In Search of Spillovers through Backward Linkages," American 
Economic Review,  94/3: 605-627 
 33 
Smith, K. (1997). Economic infrastructure and Innovation Systems, in C. Edquist (ed.) 
Systems of Innovation: Technologies, Institutions and Organizations. London and 
Washington: Pinter/Cassell Academic. 
Wells, L.T. (1998). Multinational and the developing countries, Journal of International 
Business Studies, 29: 101-114. 
Wignaraja, G., (2002). Firm size, technological capabilities and market-oriented policies in 
Mauritius, Oxford Development Studies, 30/1:87-104. 
Yudaeva, K., Kozlov, K., Melentieva, N., and Ponomareva, N. (2003). ”Does foreign 
ownership Matter? Russian experience”. Economics of Transition, 11/3: 383- 410. 
Zander, I. (1995). The Tortoise Evolution of the Multinational Corporation – Foreign 
Technological Activity in Swedish Multinational Firms 1890 – 1990, Stockholm: IIB. 
 
 34 
Figure 1 The conventional model of an innovation system  
 
 
 
Figure 2 The pre-transition model of innovation systems in centrally planned countries 
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Figure 3 Organization of R&D and Higher Education: The Soviet Model 
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Figure 4 A typical network of co-dependent R&D organizations: the Soviet model. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 5 incomplete networks of R&D organizations after transition  
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Figure 6 Theoretical model of organization of the Russian SI  
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 Table 1 The share of industrial output in 1995 (% from 1991) 
Industries % 
Energy 82.0 
Black Metallurgy 57.4 
Chemical 45.8 
Machine building 41.1 
Forestry 43.1 
Building materials 43.3 
Consumer goods 18.5 
Food  52.4 
Source: Bobilev, Y (1997) 
 
Table 2 Number of R&D organizations, 1995-2006 
R&D organizations   1991 1995 
Absolute 
change 
1995/1991 
(%) 2000 2005 2006 
Absolute 
change 
2006/1991 
(%) 
R&D institutes Total 1831 2284 19.8 2686 2115 2049 10.6 
  % 40.1 56.3 
  
65.5 59.3 56.6 
  
Construction bureaus  Total 930 548 -69.7 318 489 482 -92.9 
  % 20.4 13.5 
  
7.8 13.7 13.3 
  
Project-based organizations Total 559 207 -170.0 85 61 58 -863.8 
  % 12.2 5.1 
  
2.1 1.7 1.6 
  
Experiment plants Total 15 23 34.8 33 30 49 69.4 
  % 0.3 0.6 
  
0.8 0.8 1.4 
  
Organizations of high education Total 450 395 -13.9 390 406 417 -7.9 
  % 9.9 9.7 
  
9.5 11.4 11.5 
  
R&D units in other 
organizations Total 779 602 
-29.4 587 465 567 -37.4 
  % 17.1 14.8 
  
14.3 13.0 15.7 
  
The total number of 
organizations Total 4564 4059 
-12.4 4099 3566 3622 -26.0 
  
% 100 100 
  
100 100 100 
  
Of which state owned: Total 4564 1193 -282.6 1247 1282 1341 -240.3 
  % 100.0 29.4   30.4 36.0 37.0   
Source: Statistical yearbook of Russia (1995; 2007). 
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Table 3 scientific staff in R&D organizations (thousands) 
Scientific staff    1991 1995 
Absolute 
change 
1995/1991 
(%) 2000 2005 2006 
Absolute 
change 
2006/1991 
(%) 
Researchers & technicians Total 1227 623 -97.0 500 456.1 454 -170.4 
  % 63.2 58.7   56.3 56.1 56.3 
  
Assistants & non academic staff Total 716 441 -62.4 387 356.1 352.1 -103.4 
  % 36.8 41.6   43.6 43.8 43.6 
  
Total Total 1943 1061 -83.2 888 813.2 807.1 -140.8 
  % 100 100   100 100 100   
Source: Statistical yearbook of Russia (1995; 2007). 
 
Table 4 professional training graduates in industry (thousands) 
 Qualified graduates in: 1994 1995 1998 2000 Absolute 
change  in % 
Metallurgy  7.5 4.6 2.9 2.9 -158.6 
Chemical 10.1 10.5 6.3 7.8 -29.5 
Machine building and metal 
processing 27.4 31 11.6 7.8 
-251.3 
Forestry 13.2 12.7 11.8 14.1 6.4 
Building materials 1.7 1 0.9 0.8 -112.5 
 Consumer goods industry 98.9 99.6 77.6 70.1 -41.1 
Total:  158.8 159.4 111.1 103.5 -53.4 
Source: Statistical yearbook of Russia (1995; 2007). 
 
Table 5: Organizations of Higher Education  
Number of: 1991 1995 2000 2005 2006 
State Universities 514 569 607 655 660 
Private Universities - 193 358 413 430 
Total 514 762 965 1068 1090 
Source: Statistical yearbook of Russia (1995; 2007). 
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Table 6  GERD by performer, %  
Years/ Researches in: 1995 1998 2002 2004 
Government 26.1 53.5 24.5 25.3 
Industry 68.5 69,0 69.9 69.1 
Other national sources 5.4 1.2 5.4 5.5 
Abroad 0.0 10.3 0.2 0.1 
Source: Dezhina and Zashev (2007) 
 
Table 7  GERD by funding source, % 
Years/ Researches in: 1995 1998 2002 2004 
Government 61.5 53.5 57.4 60.6 
Industry 33.6 34.9 33.6 31.4 
Other national sources 0.3 1.2 1.0 0.4 
Abroad 4.6 10.3 8.0 7.6 
Source: Dezhina and Zashev (2007) 
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